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Abstract—This paper deals with the tradeoffs between secu-
rity, real-time and lifetime performance. Due to the multihop
nature of communication wireless ad hoc networks are very
vulnerable to attacks. Malicious nodes included in a routing
path may misbehave and organize attacks such as black holes.
Scaling the number of hops for a packet delivery we trade
off energy efficiency against security and real-time commu-
nication. To study the multihop communication we propose
a hierarchical communication model. The REWARD (receive,
watch, redirect) algorithm for secure routing is employed as
a main example for corrective actions. Symmetrical routing
is a distinguish feature of protocols such as REWARD and we
outline the threshold of conflict between power-efficient parti-
tioning of communication links and symmetrical routing.
Keywords— ad hoc networks, low-power routing, multihop com-
munication, secure routing.
1. Introduction
Ad hoc networks have a wide spectrum of military and
commercial applications. Ad hoc networks are employed
in situations where installing an infrastructure is too expen-
sive, too vulnerable or the network is transient. The inter-
action between the nodes is based on wireless communica-
tion. Packets are forwarded in a multihop manner. Nodes
have a limited radio footprint and when a node receives
a packet it applies a routing algorithm to select a neighbor
for forwarding.
There is a class ad hoc networks, sensor networks, where
the requirements for lifetime and size of the nodes are
driven to extremes. A wireless sensor network consists of
a large number of nodes that may be randomly and densely
deployed. Sensor nodes are capable of sensing many types
of information such as temperature, light, humidity and ra-
diation. Sensor networks must collect data in an area of in-
terest for months or years. Since the energy is a scarce and
usually non-renewable resource, the network’s functional-
ity must be viewed from a low-power perspective. Sensor
network nodes execute three major tasks: sensing, compu-
tation and communication.
Communication energy dominates the overall energy bud-
get. The greater than linear relationship between trans-
mit energy and distance promises to reduce the energy
cost when the radio link is partitioned. Nodes calculate
the distance and tune their transmit power accordingly.
Consequently, it would be beneﬁcial to use several hops
to reach a node within the transmission radius instead of
a direct link. Along with available locations of the nodes,
a multihop optimization requires an appropriate power
model. For some applications it is not necessary nodes
to have real coordinates. Instead, nodes may have virtual
coordinates: hop-distances to other nodes.
Moreover, some applications require the network to inﬂu-
ence the environment via actuators. Synchronization be-
tween input and output demands real-time traﬃc. Real-
time forwarding of packets under multihop communication
scheme is a serious challenge. When we factor in secu-
rity, the outlook becomes even more grim. Packets travel
over several nodes and malicious attacks are easy to orga-
nize. To detect malicious inﬂuence and wage corrective
actions the nodes must spend extra energy. Consequently,
the multihop nature of ad hoc networks, while beneﬁcial
for energy reduction, brings the packets delivery time up.
The dynamic nature of the network and the power-eﬃcient
partitioning of communication links in particular, often
result in unpredictable traﬃc timing parameters. Enemy
nodes included in a routing path may misbehave and any
attempt to make the network less vulnerable requires extra
energy and aﬀects the lifetime, thus closing the loop.
2. Related Work
Diﬀerent medium access control (MAC) protocols are dis-
cussed in [1]–[6]. Energy eﬃciency is the primary goal
of the research. While a power saving technique, termed
Span [1], dynamically splits the nodes into sleeping nodes
and forwarding nodes, S-MAC, a MAC protocol [2], es-
tablishes a low duty cycle operation in all nodes. Ex-
tremely opportunistic routing (ExOR) is a routing method
developed to reduce the total number of transmissions tak-
ing into account the actual packet propagation [3]. Data
transmission algebra (DTA) has been developed to gen-
erate complex transmission schedules based on collision-
free concurrent data transmissions [5]. In related research
we proposed ALS-MAC, a medium access control proto-
col where contention-based advertising slots are mapped to
scheduled-based transmission slots [6]. The energy model
employed in this paper has been adopted from [7], [8]. De-
spite there being a plethora of sensing and MAC papers,
comparatively little has been published on the compan-
ion task of actuation and real-time requirements. Sensor-
actuator networks are discussed in [9], [10]. The problem
of obtaining virtual coordinates is addressed in [11].
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Diﬀerent aspects of node architectures and capabilities can
be found in [12]–[17]. The power reduction methods dis-
cussed in [15]–[17] are not conﬁned to computation energy
of network nodes. They can be applied, also, in other cases
where voltage-scalable or speed-scalable central process-
ing units (CPUs) follow the current requirements and save
energy. Another approach to reduce the power consump-
tion is to remove hardware used for localization, such as
global positioning system (GPS), and utilize receive signal
strength (RSS). The resulting accuracy and impact factors
are investigated in [14].
Methods for energy eﬃcient multihop communication are
discussed in [18]–[22]. A detailed investigation for simple
settings is available in [19]. In related research we studied
multihop optimization for non-regular topologies [6], [10].
An Aloha type access control mechanism for large, mul-
tihop, wireless networks is deﬁned in [21]. The protocol
optimizes the product of the number of simultaneously suc-
cessful transmissions per unit of space, spatial reuse, by the
average range of each transmission.
A review of routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks
is available in [23]. The problem of radio irregularity is
discussed in [24]. Later in Section 5, we compare distances
with the communication range. Due to radio irregularity
some neighbors located within the transmission disk may
be inaccessible while some remote nodes, outside the disk,
will be capable to communicate. Since quite a few proces-
sor architectures vie for attention in the realm of sensor net-
works, target-aware modeling of routing algorithms helps
to evaluate important timing properties [25]. Security of
wireless sensor networks is in focus in [26]–[31]. Two pa-
pers, [22] and [30], emphasize the fact that multiobjective
design is needed. Listening to neighbor transmissions to
detect black hole attacks is discussed in [32]–[36].
3. Communication Model
The communication model describes a packet forwarding
from a source to a destination. The destination is within the
communication range of the source. The communication
model C, has three components: a set of the locations of
nodes L, a medium access control model M, and an energy
model E:
C = {L, M, E} . (1)
3.1. Medium Access Control Model
Medium access control mechanism has a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the energy eﬃciency [2], [4], [6]. Currently avail-
able MAC protocols for wireless sensor networks can
be broken down into two major types: contention-based
and scheduled-based. While under contention-based proto-
cols nodes compete among each other for channel access,
scheduled-based schemes rely on prearranged collision-free
links between nodes. There are diﬀerent methods to assign
collision-free links to each node. Links may be assigned
as time slots, frequency bands, or spread spectrum codes.
However, size and cost constrains may not permit allocat-
ing complex radio subsystems for the node architecture.
Logically, time-division multiple access (TDMA) schedul-
ing is the most common scheme for the domain of wireless
sensor networks. The limited communication range of net-
work nodes provides an extra opportunity for collision-free
interaction, space division access [5], [6], [21].
3.1.1. Assume Scheduled Links
In order to save energy nodes should stay in a sleeping
mode as long as possible. Ideally, nodes should have pre-
arranged collision-free links and wake up only to exchange
packets. This MAC approach can be termed assume sched-
uled links (ASL). The ASL model has two parameters:
a packet length in bits p and a bit rate B:
M = {ASL, p, B} . (2)
While ASL is a theoretical concept, it helps to outline the
ﬂoor of the energy required for communication.
3.1.2. Beacon Advertise Transmit
Beacon advertise transmit (BAT) model is a widespread
MAC mechanism [4]. Beacons are employed to synchro-
nize internode communications. A beacon period TB in-
cludes two major sections. The period begins with a traﬃc
indication window TA. During TA all nodes are listening
and pending packets are advertised. The nodes addressed
till the end of TA send acknowledgements and receive data
packets. Data transmissions are followed by acknowledge-
ment frames to conﬁrm successful reception. Figure 1 il-
lustrates a beacon period.
Fig. 1. Beacon period.
The BAT model has ﬁve parameters: TA, TB, a data packet
length in bits p, a control packet length in bits q, and a bit
rate B:
M = {BAT, TA, TB, p, q, B} . (3)
3.2. Energy Model
The energy used to send a bit over a distance d via radio
communication may be written as
E = adn + b , (4)
where a is a proportionality constant [7], [8]. The radio
parameter n is a path loss exponent that describes the rate
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at which the transmitted power decays with increasing dis-
tance. Typically, n is between 2 and 4. The b constant is
associated with speciﬁc receivers, CPUs and computational
algorithms. Thus the model emerges as
E = {a,n,b,PR} , (5)
where PR is the power consumption of a turned on re-
ceiver.
4. Real-Time Behavior
Using the BAT model and counting the beacon periods
nodes are in position to calculate the packets delivery time.
While this completely applies for destination nodes, in-
termediate nodes can use the actual packet propagation
time and virtual coordinates to foresee the overall delivery
time.
In the large, energy versus real-time tradeoﬀs can be re-
solved via diﬀerent values assigned for the beacon period.
In the small, at each hop nodes decide whether to include
an extra intermediate node for power eﬃciency or to for-
ward the packet as fast as possible. The local decision is
based on the actual propagation of the packet measured in
number of beacon periods and the remaining number of
hops.
5. Lifetime
An ad hoc network lifetime can be measured by the time
when the ﬁrst node runs out of energy, or a network
can be declared dead when a certain fraction of nodes
die. Alternatively, the system lifetime can be measured
by application-speciﬁc parameters, such as the time un-
til the system can no longer provide acceptable quality of
service. Clearly, the higher the energy eﬃciency is, the
longer the network will survive. The energy eﬃciency can
be optimized at three levels.
5.1. Node Architecture
A typical node is built around a low-power microcon-
troller [12], [13], [15]. Wireless transceivers create phys-
ical links between nodes. Hardware provides the following
low-power mechanisms. The receiver and transmitter can
be individually enabled and disabled. The transmit power
can be adjusted gradually. For many applications nodes are
capable of determining their coordinates. Voltage-scalable
systems may apply dynamic voltage or clock frequency
scaling to reduce the power consumption.
5.2. Multihop Routing Service
Once the routing protocol has provided the next relay an-
other neighbor can be considered to partition the link. The
number of hops is increased to save energy. As an ad-
ditional beneﬁt, the reduced transmit power allows better
spatial reuse.
Figure 2 shows how an intermediate node can be used to
break down the link between a source S and a destina-
tion D into two hops.
Fig. 2. Routing via an intermediate node.
Theorem 1: Let C = {L{ASL, p,B},{a,4,b,PR}} be the
communication model of a wireless ad hoc network. If
the distance between the source S and the destination D is
d ≥
(
(8b + (p/B)PR)/7a
) 1
4 and the distance between
an intermediate node and the halfway point between S
and D is r ≤ (−0.75d2 + 0.25(9d4 − a−1(8b − 7ad4 +
(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 , the two-hop communication requires
less energy than the direct link.
Proof : We must prove when the following inequality holds
ad41 + b + ad42 + b + 2(p/B)PR≤ ad4 + b +(p/B)PR . (6)
Taking into account that
d1 = (d2/4−dr cosα + r2)
1
2 , (7)
d2 = (d2/4 + dr cosα + r2)
1
2 . (8)
We get
16ar4 + 8ad2(1 + 2cos2 α)r2 + 8b−7ad4 +(p/B)PR ≤ 0 .
(9)
The inequality has solutions if and only if d ≥
(
(8b +
(p/B)PR)/7a
) 1
4 . Since the threshold value for the distance r
will vary with α , we take the worst case, cosα = 1.
Using the quadratic formula
r ≤ (−0.75d2+0.25(9d4−a−1(8b−7ad4 +(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 .
(10)

Figure 3 shows plots for the radius r compared with
half of the distance. This example assumes two bit rates,
1 Mbit/s and 0.5 Mbit/s, a = 0.2 fJ/m4, b = 1 nJ, PR =
10 mW and p = 128 bit.
Theorem 2: Let C = {L{BAT,TA,TB, p,q,B},{a,4,b,PR}}
be the communication model of a wireless ad hoc network.
Let the average number of neighbors listening to a beacon
transmission be D. If the distance between the source S
and the destination D:
d ≥
(
(b(3q + p)+ PRB−1(q + p)
+PRDTA)a−1(3.5625q + 0.875p)−1
) 1
4 (11)
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Fig. 3. Radius r scales with the distance for two bit rates.
and the distance between the intermediate node and the
halfway point between S and D
r ≤ (−0.25d2(10.5q + 3p + 0.5qd)(3q+ p+qd)−1
+0.5a−1(3q+p+qd)−1(0.25a2d2(10.5q+3p+0.5qd)2
−2a(3q + p + qd)(−ad4(3.5625q + 0.875p)
+b(3q + p)+ PRB−1(q + p)+ PRDTA))
1
2 )
1
2 (12)
the two-hop communication requires less energy than the
direct link.

The radius r for a given distance d indicates application-
speciﬁc opportunities for power-eﬃcient partitioning of
Fig. 4. Radius r scales with the distance for two MAC models.
communication links. Figure 4 compares ASL and BAT
MAC models for a bit rate of 512 kbit/s.
5.3. Routing Algorithms
Routing algorithms can be based on two major ap-
proaches: topology-based and position-based routing [23].
The topology-based algorithms can be further split into
table-driven and demand-driven. The main idea behind the
table-driven routing protocols is to create a clear picture of
all available routes from each node to every other node in
the network. In contrast to the table-driven protocols, the
demand-driven algorithms create routes via route discovery
procedures only when a necessity arises.
Position-based routing algorithms utilize the physical po-
sitions of the participating nodes [19], [21], [23]. Po-
sition-based or geographic routing does not require each
node to have the locations of all other nodes. Each node
keeps track of the coordinates of its neighbors and their
neighbors. A greedy routing algorithm based on geographic
distance selects the closest to the destination neighbor for
the next hop [19].
Assume that the nodes of a wireless ad hoc network are
members of the following set N = {N1,N2,N3, . . . ,Nn(N)}.
The nodes are placed in a rectangular region of X by Y .
The distance between node i and node j is d(i, j). The
distance between node k and the halfway point between
node i and node j is d(k, mi, j).
Routing algorithms are employed to determine the next hop
of Ni, N+1i . The distance between Ni and its next hop N
+1
i
is d(i,+1). Likewise, the distance between Nk and the
halfway point between Ni and N+1i is d(k,mi,+1). A state-
ment power (d(i, j)) in the pseudocode listing adjusts the
transmit power according to the distance d(i, j). A state-
ment send (Ni → N j) indicates a packet forwarding from
node i toward node j.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure to determine the
set NRi , which includes the one-hop neighbours of Ni.
The R denotes the communication range.
Algorithm 1: NRi ← OneHop(Ni)
NRi = /01
for 1≤ j ≤ n(N), j 6= i do2
if d(i, j)≤ R3
NRi = NRi ∪N j4
end if5
end for6
Algorithm 2 applies the greedy routing algorithm to ﬁnd
the next relay of Ni.
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Algorithm 2: N+1i ← NextHop(Ni, ND, NRi )
if ND ∈ NRi1
return ND2
end if3
s = (X2 +Y 2)
1
24
for 1≤ j ≤ n(N), j 6= i do5
if N j ∈ NRi and d( j,D) < s6
N+1i = N j, s = d( j,D)7
end if8
end for9
The multihop service can be integrated into the routing
algorithm.
Algorithm 3 applies Theorem 1 or 2 to partition the com-
munication link until suitable intermediate nodes are found.
The procedure results in one forwarding.
Algorithm 3: MultiHop(Ni, N+1i )
do1
MULTI = 02
d = d(i, +1)3
s = (X2 +Y2) 124
for 1≤ j ≤ n(N), j 6= i do5
if d( j, mi,+1)≤MIN(r,s)6
s = d( j, mi,+1), N+1i = N j, MULTI = 17
end if8
end for9
while MULTI10
power
(
d(i, +1)
)
11
send (Ni → N+1i )12
Algorithm 4 describes the successive approximation rout-
ing. The interaction between the routing procedure and the
low-power forwarding is implemented via successive ap-
proximations. As soon as the routing algorithm determines
the next hop, multihop optimization is applied to select
Algorithm 4: Send (NS, ND)
Ni = NS1
do2
NextHop (Ni, ND, NRi )3
MultiHop (Ni, N+1i )4
while Ni 6= ND5
an intermediate node. As soon as the packet is sent to
the intermediate node, the routing algorithm is executed
again. The multihop service algorithm itself is a succes-
sive approximation procedure as well.
In a two-hop distance approach, each node maintains a ta-
ble of all immediate neighbors as well as each neighbor’s
neighbors. The number of hops taken into account deter-
mines the vulnerability of the routing in case of topology
holes. However, considering more hops will require longer
execution times. Figure 5 shows how the transition from
Fig. 5. Execution time to select the next relay.
a single hop to two hops brings the execution time up. The
code has been written in C and compiled for two CPUs:
8051 and Atmel AVR [25].
6. Security
The network functional partitioning into sensing, computa-
tion and communication can be used to deal with possible
avenues of attacks. First, a misbehaving node may pro-
vide false sensor readings. In general, this kind of attack
is not eﬀective. Collected data is aggregated and a small
number of malicious nodes can not change the proﬁle of
the physical event. However, a false alarm, an input has
reached a threshold, will wake up several nodes and attack
the batteries. Another attack related to the environment is
a wrong location. Sensing is useful only in the context of
where the data has been measured.
In contrast to sensing, a well placed enemy may success-
fully attack via wrong calculations. Aggregation is im-
portant for power eﬃciency and nodes that aggregate data
packets are in a good position to attack.
Communication is what makes ad hoc networks most vul-
nerable and the multihop forwarding of packets unrolls am-
ple possibilities for attackers. Once a malicious node has
been included on the routing path, it will be in position
to change the content of the packets. Along with data,
packets may convey code. Mobile agent-based sensor net-
works distribute the computation into the participating leaf
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nodes [28], [29]. Since agents may visit a long path of
nodes, a single modiﬁed packet can force several nodes
to execute enemy code. Another axis along which pack-
ets can be aﬀected relates to timing. A scheduling attack
would change the number of past beacon periods a packet
carries. Another form of a scheduling attack is delayed
packets. An extreme type of this attack, termed black hole,
is observed when a malicious node consumes packets. In
a special case of black hole, an attacker could create a gray
hole, in which it selectively drops some packets but not oth-
ers. For example, the malicious node may forward control
packets but not data packets.
7. REWARD Algorithm
The REWARD (receive, watch, redirect) is a routing
method that provides a scalable security service for geo-
graphic ad hoc routing [33]–[35].
7.1. Black Holes Data Base
The algorithm creates a distributed data base for detected
black hole and scheduling attacks. The data base keeps
records for suspicious nodes and areas. The REWARD se-
curity service provides alternative paths for the geographic
routing in an attempt to avoid misbehaving nodes and
regions of detected attacks. The algorithm utilizes two
types of broadcast messages, MISS (material for intersec-
tion of suspisious sets) and SAMBA (suspicious area, mark
a black-hole attack), to recruit security servers. Security
servers are nodes that keep records of the distributed data
base and modify the geographic forwarding of packets to
bypass insecure nodes and regions.
Assume that a demand-driven protocol performs a route
discovery procedure. When the destination receives the
query, it sends its location back and waits for a packet.
If the packet does not arrive within a speciﬁed period of
time, the destination node broadcasts a MISS message. The
destination copies the list of all involved nodes from the
query to the MISS message. Since the reason for not re-
ceiving the packet is most likely a black hole attack, all
nodes listed in the MISS message are under suspicion.
Nodes collect MISS messages and intersect them to detect
misbehaving participants in the routes. The detected mali-
cious nodes are excluded from the routing if other paths are
available.
Fig. 6. Transmissions must be received by two nodes.
Radio is inherently a broadcast medium and nodes can de-
tect black hole attacks if they listen to neighbor transmis-
sions [32]. Figure 6 shows an example. Each node tunes
the transmit power to reach both immediate neighbors,
N+1i and N
−1
i . We call this type of forwarding symmet-
rical. The nodes transmit packets and watch if the packets
are forwarded properly. If a malicious node does not act
as expected, the previous node in the path will broadcast
a SAMBA message.
Fig. 7. REWARD against two black holes.
Figure 7 presents an example routing with the assumption
that two malicious nodes would attempt a black hole attack.
In this case the algorithm requires the nodes to listen for
two retransmissions. Figure 8 indicates the exact positions
of two black holes in the path. The ﬁrst malicious node
forwards the packet using the required transmit power to
deceive two nodes backward. The second malicious node
drops the packet, however the attack is detected by the last
node before the black holes. The missing transmission is
shown by a dot line in Fig. 8. An extra black hole in the
path would mask the attack.
Fig. 8. REWARD detects the second black hole.
In order to determine the eﬀectiveness of REWARD we
used ANTS (ad hoc networks traﬃc simulator) [34], [35].
We assume that all nodes are stationary throughout the
simulation. Figure 9 illustrates simulation results of the
throughput, 100 packets routing for eight example de-
ployments. Each deployment has a density of 100 nodes
randomly located in a square kilometer. The maximum
communication range of the nodes is 100 m. Also,
the simulation results are obtained at 10% misbehaving
nodes. MISS servers are recruited in a rectangular region.
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The source and destination locations deﬁne the diagonal of
the rectangle.
Fig. 9. The fraction of packets received for eight examples.
Fig. 10. Detected malicious nodes against false detection.
Figure 10 shows the fraction of malicious nodes detected
against false detection. False detection is associated with
nodes excluded from the network as malicious when in
fact they are not. For the current simulation, nodes that
are listed in two or more MISS messages are marked as
malicious.
7.2. Energy Overhead
We distinguish between two types of security energy over-
head. Static overhead is the additional energy required to
watch for attacks. Dynamic overhead is the extra amount
of energy spent to detect compromised nodes and mitigate
routing misbehavior. While the dynamic overhead will vary
from application to application, the static overhead is a con-
stant and an inevitable item in the energy budget.
Since secure routing protocols such as REWARD require
symmetrical forwarding, the power eﬃciency is declined.
Figure 11 presents symmetrical routing for an example de-
ployment. Three cases must be considered according to the
distances:
d(i,−1)≤
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2− r . (13)
There is no security overhead in this case:
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2− r < d(i,−1)≤ (d(i,+1))/2 + r . (14)
Fig. 11. Symmetrical routing.
Again, there is no single-hop security overhead. Opportu-
nities for partitioning of the link remain if neighbors are
located within the shaded area (Fig. 11):
d(i,−1) >
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2 + r . (15)
Symmetrical routing may not increase the energy, how-
ever, partitioning of the link is not power eﬃcient in
this case.
Algorithm 5 provides multihop optimization for symmetri-
cal routing.
Algorithm 5: MultiHopSym (Ni,N+1i )
s = (X2 +Y 2)
1
21
if d(i,−1) >
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2 + r2
power
(
MAX(d(i,+1),d(i,−1))
)
3
send (Ni → N+1i )4
return5
end if6
if d(i,−1)≤
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2− r7
for 1≤ j ≤ n(N), j 6= i do8
if d( j,mi,+1)≤MIN(r,s)9
s = d( j,mi,+1), N+1i = N j10
end if11
end for12
power
(
d(i,+1)
)
13
send (Ni → N+1i )14
return15
end if16
for 1≤ j ≤ n(N), j 6= i do17
if d( j,mi,+1)≤MIN(r,s) and d(i, j)≥ d(i,−1)18
s = d( j,mi,+1), N+1i = N j19
end if20
end for21
power
(
d(i,+1)
)
22
send (Ni → N+1i )23
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Theorems 3 and 4 are companion proofs of Theorems 1
and 2, respectively, for symmetrical routing.
Theorem 3: Let C = {L{ASL, p, B},{a, 4, b, PR}} be the
communication model of a wireless ad hoc network which
applies symmetrical routing. If the distance
d(i,+1)≥
(
(8b +(p/B)PR)/7a
) 1
4 , (16)
the distance
d(i,−1) ≤
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2−(−0.75(d(i,+1))2
+0.25(9(d(i,+1))4−a−1(8b−7a(d(i,+1))4
+(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 (17)
and the distance between an intermediate node and the
halfway point between S and D:
r ≤ (−0.75(d(i,+1))2 + 0.25(9(d(i,+1))4
−a−1(8b−7a(d(i,+1))4 +(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 (18)
the two-hop communication requires less energy than the
direct link.
Proof : From Theorem 1 the shortest distance between S
and a power eﬃcient intermediate node would be
(
d(i,+1)
)
/2−(−0.75(d(i,+1))2 +0.25(9(d(i,+1))4
−a−1(8b−7a(d(i,+1))4 +(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 . (19)
Since, this distance is greater or equal to the distance
d(i,−1), the symmetrical routing does not aﬀect the power
eﬃcient partitioning of the link. Any intermediate node
closer to the halfway point between S and D than
(−0.75(d(i,+1))2 +0.25(9(d(i,+1))4
−a−1(8b−7a(d(i,+1))4 +(p/B)PR))
1
2 )
1
2 . (20)
will decrease the energy. 
Theorem 4: Let C = {L{BAT,TA,TB, p,q,B},{a,4,b,PR}}
be the communication model of a wireless ad hoc network
which applies symmetrical routing. If the distance
d(i,+1) ≥
(
(b(3q + p)+ PRB−1(q + p)
+PRDTA)a−1(3.5625q+0.875p)−1
) 1
4 , (21)
the distance
d(i,−1)≤ (d(i,+1))/2−(−0.25(d(i,+1))2(10.5q+3p
+0.5qd(i,+1))(3q+p +qd(i,+1))−1+0.5a−1(3q
+p+qd(i,+1))−1(0.25a2(d(i,+1))2(10.5q
+3p + 0.5q(d(i,+1))2−2a(3q + p
+qd(i,+1))(−a(d(i,+1))4(3.5625q+0.875p)
+b(3q+p)+PRB−1(q+p)+PRDTA))
1
2 )
1
2 (22)
and the distance between an intermediate node and the
halfway point between S and D:
r ≤ (−0.25(d(i,+1))2(10.5q + 3p + 0.5qd(i,+1))(3q
+p + qd(i,+1))−1 + 0.5a−1(3q + p
+qd(i,+1))−1(0.25a2(d(i,+1))2(10.5q + 3p
+0.5q(d(i,+1))2−2a(3q + p
+qd(i,+1))(−a(d(i,+1))4(3.5625q + 0.875p)
+b(3q + p)+ PRB−1(q + p)+ PRDTA))
1
2 )
1
2 (23)
the two-hop communication requires less energy than the
direct link.

8. Conclusion
This paper manifests wireless ad hoc networks need mul-
tiobjective design. The multihop communication approach
brings tradeoﬀs between security, real-time and lifetime.
We proposed a hierarchical communication model and em-
ployed it to compare how two MAC models are capable of
partitioning the communication link for non-regular topolo-
gies. The proofs can be used to organize look-up tables in
the nodes memory and streamline the selection of the best
next relay. We evaluated the static energy overhead associ-
ated with algorithms for secure routing, such as REWARD,
which will help to reassess the lifetime of the network.
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